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Abstract—Unauthorized data alteration has been a long-
standing threat since the emergence of malware. System and
application software can be reinstalled and hardware can be
replaced, but user data is priceless in many cases. Especially in re-
cent years, ransomware has become high-impact due to its direct
monetization model. State-of-the-art defenses are mostly based
on known signature or behavior analysis, and more importantly,
require an uncompromised OS kernel. However, malware with
the highest software privileges has shown its obvious existence.
We propose to move from current detection/recovery based
mechanisms to data loss prevention, where the focus is on
armoring data instead of counteracting malware. Our solution,
Inuksuk, relies on today’s Trusted Execution Environments
(TEEs), as available both on the CPU and storage device, to
achieve programmable write protection. We back up a copy of
user-selected files as write-protected at all times, and subsequent
updates are written as new versions securely through TEE.
We implement Inuksuk on Windows 7 and 10, and Linux
(Ubuntu); our core design is OS and application agnostic, and
incurs no run-time performance penalty for applications. File
transfer disruption can be eliminated or alleviated through
access modes and customizable update policies (e.g., interval,
granularity). For Inuksuk’s adoptability in modern OSes, we have
also ported Flicker (EuroSys 2008), a defacto standard tool for
in-OS privileged TEE management, to the latest 64-bit Windows.
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
The first known crypto-ransomware dates back to 1989
(only file/directory names were encrypted [39]; see also [64]).
Crypto-based attack vectors were formally introduced by
Young and Yung in 1996 [78] (see also [79]). After the Cryp-
toLocker attack in 2013, robust crypto-ransomware families
have been growing steadily, with a large number of attacks in
2016 (see the F-Secure ransomware “tube-map” [17]). Exam-
ples of recent high-impact ransomware attacks, include [38],
[66], [21], [10], [2], [57], affecting individuals and enter-
prise/government systems alike. An IBM X-Factor survey
of 600 business leaders and 1021 consumers in the US
reveals the effectiveness of current ransomware attacks: 70%
of affected businesses paid the ransom (46% of businesses
reported to have been infected); individual users are less
willing to pay (e.g., 39% users without children may pay
ransom for family photos vs. 55% users with children). For
a conservative estimate of financial loss, a recent end-to-
end measurement [23] shows that over $16 million USD in
ransoms has been collected from 19,750 potential victims
over a two-year period. Ransomware’s direct monetization
has benefited from pseudo-anonymous payment systems such
as Paysafecard.com, prepaid/gift cards, and crypto currencies
(e.g., Bitcoin), and not-easily-traced indirect payments such as
sending SMSes to premium numbers [31].
Common anti-malware approaches relying on binary signa-
tures are largely ineffective against ransomware (see e.g., [55]).
Some solutions rely on system/user behavior signatures, exem-
plified by file system activity monitoring, e.g., [30], [55], [14],
[29]. To complement detection based solutions (or assuming
they may be bypassed), recovery-based mechanisms may also
be deployed, e.g., Paybreak [32] stores (suspected) file encryp-
tion keys on-the-fly, right after generated but before encrypted
with the ransomware’s public key.
On the other hand, general (rootkit-level) malware that
targets to corrupt/delete user data for various purposes also
has long existed, e.g., wiper malware [71], without demanding
a ransom, which is worse in terms of recovery. In addition
to recent incidents (e.g., [19]), this is also exemplified by
the notorious virus CIH [27] (1998), which erased files and
even corrupted BIOS. Several countermeasures against generic
rootkit attacks have also been proposed, focusing on intrusion-
resiliency and forensics (e.g., S4 [60]), and preventing persis-
tent infection (e.g., RRD [12]). FlashGuard [24] is the only
proposal focusing on rootkit ransomware, which leverages
the out-of-place write feature of modern SSDs, providing
an implicit backup. It requires modifying SSD firmware and
a trusted clock within the SSD (currently unavailable). We
discuss academic proposals in more detail in Section VII.
Inspired by traditional data access control (e.g., permission-
based and read-only protection in file systems1) and backup
mechanisms, we shift the focus from detection/recovery to
data loss prevention against rootkit malware (including ran-
somware). If user files could remain unmodifiable by malware
even after the system compromise, no reactive defense would
be necessary—enabling data loss prevention. However, this
new paradigm requires that writes must be allowed at certain
times when new data is added or changes are made. Of
course, rootkit malware can also make malicious changes to
the protected files once write access is enabled.
We propose to achieve data loss prevention with an append-
only history-preserving backup storage framework, where pro-
tected files are always exposed read-only to applications and
the operating system, and append operations are allowed only
in a secure manner. In our threat model with rootkit malware,
such read-only access (equivalent to write protection) need
to be enforced by hardware/firmware to counteract privi-
leged software. Considering that there exists no commercially-
off-the-shelf (COTS) storage device with this append-only
feature, we resort to trusted execution environments (TEEs,
1Note: read-only folders/files enforced by the OS (e.g., Windows 10
“controlled folder access” [44]), only prevents unprivileged access.
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see Section II) to allow programmable write protection. We
use a host-side TEE to enforce the (append-only) logic and
confidentiality-protect an authorization secret, and a device-
side TEE to allow write access only with that secret. In
a broader sense, the placement of secrets and logic across
multiple TEEs relies on the underlying assumptions and sup-
port from available hardware (refer to Section IV for further
discussion).
By choosing the self-encrypting drive (SED, see Section II)
as the device-side TEE, we design Inuksuk,2 to protect
existing user files from being deleted or encrypted by malware.
Inuksuk functions as a secure data vault: user-selected files are
copied to a write-protected SED partition, and the secret to
allow write-access is cryptographically sealed to the machine
state (i.e., the genuine Inuksuk and the correct hardware
platform), and hence, allowing file writes to the data vault only
from the trusted environment. Deletion/modification outside
the environment will fail due to the write protection. Mean-
while, access to the read/writable copy on the original partition
is not affected (processed at the next commit). Inuksuk takes
rootkit ransomware as a major threat but also works against
any privileged unauthorized data alteration.
Inuksuk works without prompting for any user secret. It
merely appends to existing data. Files created or modified
on the original partition are all treated the same way, and
copied (i.e., committed) onto the protected partition as new
versions in the host-side TEE (referred to as TEE thereinafter
if not otherwise specified), without overwriting existing files.
However, user consent is needed for solicited file deletion, e.g.,
when the user no longer needs a document. Our assumption
is that deletions are done occasionally and preferably in batch
(disk space is relatively cheap). Inuksuk comes with a built-
in mini file browser for the user to select and delete files
in TEE. Files on the protected partition remain accessible as
read-only, allowing the user to mount the drive elsewhere for
recovery without TEE in the case of malware detection or
system corruption (see Sections IV and VI).
We choose to instantiate the host-side TEE using Trusted
Platform Module (TPM) chips, and CPUs with Intel TXT or
AMD SVM (see Sections IV-C and IV-D for reasons, and
Section II for background). Due to the exclusive nature (which
is also a great security benefit) of the TXT/SVM environment,
during file operations on the protected partition, the system
is unavailable for regular use. We thus provide two access
modes for both home and enterprise users: a) Network-based.
User devices and computers are connected to a regular network
storage system; a dedicated Inuksuk computer then copies user
data from the regular storage to its protected storage, and
thus user experience is not affected. b) Stand-alone. The user
works with the Inuksuk-equipped device, e.g., a laptop. In this
mode, system unavailability is reduced with custom scheduling
policies (e.g., triggered during idle periods, akin to Windows
updates).
While Inuksuk can provide strong security guarantees,
its implementation faces several technical challenges. For
example, the TXT/SVM environment lacks run-time support
and we must directly communicate with the SED device
2Inuksuk is an Inuit word with multiple meanings, including: a (food)
storage point/marker.
(for security) and parse the file system therein (involving
performance considerations). Note that the use of Intel SGX is
infeasible for Inuksuk, as SGX allows only ring-3 instructions,
i.e., cannot access the disk without the underlying (untrusted)
OS. Also, the user OS is unaware of the TXT/SVM sessions,
so the devices (i.e., keyboard/display for secure user interface)
are left in an unexpected state (see Section V). Note that
there have been a series of attacks based on SMM (System
Management Mode) over the past few years, some even
affecting Intel TXT [75]. This does not pose a serious threat
to Inuksuk, because of its particular setting, e.g., exclusiveness
with no bootloader/hypervisor/OS involved (discussed more
in Section VI). Last but not least, TXT’s exclusiveness also
protects it from many side-channel attacks that are highly
effective against non-exclusive TEEs such as Intel SGX and
ARM TrustZone.
Contributions.
1) We design and implement Inuksuk against root-privileged
data tampering, in a radical shift in threat model from
existing academic/industry solutions. We target loss pre-
vention of existing data, instead of detection/prevention of
malware/ransomware.
2) Inuksuk’s design is tied to the combination of established
and standardized trusted execution environments (in our
prototype, SED disks and Intel TXT/AMD SVM with the
TPM chip). Integrating TXT/SVM, TPM, and SED/Opal
together in a seamless way with a regular OS (Win-
dows/Linux) is non-trivial, but offers a significant leap
in the arms-race against malware. Our solution, together
with the ported Flicker (which will be both open-sourced),
solves several engineering/performance problems when
faced with exclusive TEEs (e.g., DMA with TEE, disk/file
access, display), which can also be methodologically useful
for other TEE applications.
3) We implement Inuksuk on both Windows and Linux
(Ubuntu). The core design is OS-agnostic. Our prototype
achieves decent disk access performance within the OS-less
TXT/SVM environment (around 32MB/s read and 42MB/s
write), when committing files to the protected partition.
The regular disk access to original files from the user OS
remains unaffected, i.e., all applications perform as before.
4) We also port the state-of-the-art in-OS trusted execution
manager Flicker [42] to Windows 10 64-bit (Flicker’s latest
version only supported Windows 7 32-bit). This advances
privileged trusted execution (as opposed to user-space only)
up to date, available to other secure processing applications
in modern 64-bit operating systems.
5) Beyond unwanted modifications of protected data, Inuksuk
can be used as a generic secure storage with fine-grained
access control, enabling read/write operations and data
encryption (with Inuksuk-stored keys), if desired. Inuksuk
in the stand-alone mode is locally enforced without any
network dependency, and operates with a small TCB.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we briefly explain certain terms and back-
ground information to facilitate understanding of the Inuksuk
design and prototype implementation hereinafter.
Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). Modern CPUs usu-
ally support a special secure mode of execution, which ensures
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that only pre-configured unaltered code can be executed,
with integrity, secrecy and attestability; and provides a form
of isolation from both other software/firmware and physical
tampering. TEEs can be exclusive, preempting and suspending
other code (e.g., Intel TXT and AMD SVM), or concurrent,
co-existing with other processes (e.g., Intel SGX, ARM Trust-
Zone, and AMD SEV [46]). There are also privileged (TXT,
SVM, SEV and TrustZone) TEEs and unprivileged TEEs
(SGX). This is about whether privileged instructions (e.g., I/O)
are allowed or untrusted OS has to be relied on to provide such
services.
Technically, TEEs cannot function alone. For the purpose
of storing measurements (to be matched with that of the code
being loaded) and secure storage of execution secrets, a Secure
Element (SE) is used in conjunction. It can be part of the
processor die, an integrated chip, or a discrete module.
In this paper, we use the term TEE in a broader sense,
i.e., referring to the aforementioned secure processing feature
of any processor-equipped devices that operates with secrets,
in addition to that of PC and mobile platforms. For instance,
more and more IoT devices make use of microcontrollers with
ARM TrustZone for Cortex-M such as Nordic nRF91 [72]
and NuMicro M2351 [51]. Also, there are legacy devices with
secure processors (cf. smart cards [13]).
Intel TXT and AMD SVM. Trust Execution Technology
(TXT) is Intel’s first “late launch” technique, aiming at estab-
lishing trusted execution any time after system reboot, without
relying on what has already been loaded (e.g., BIOS). It is
exclusive, removing software side-channel attack vectors and
with the help of VT-d [7], largely defends against violations
from the I/O space. AMD SVM (Secure Virtual Machine) is a
similar technology, which we consider as equivalent to TXT,
with slight differences, e.g., it does not involve an explicit
ACM (Authorized Code Module, such as TXT’s SINIT) and
has fewer requirements for the measured program (called SLB
in SVM and MLE in TXT). Nevertheless, they share the
security properties we need for Inuksuk so we refer to them
undistinguished as TXT/SVM hereinafter. When individual
terms are used, the discussion is specific to one.
Note that TXT/SVM has different positioning than Intel
SGX and can handle privileged instructions, e.g., device I/O
as needed by Inuksuk. They do not replace each other. TXT
is widely supported by many commercial-off-the-shelf Intel
CPUs,3 and SVM (SKINIT) is available in almost all modern
AMD CPUs.
TPM. Trusted Platform Module is a microchip, serving as the
SE for TEEs (usually TXT or SVM). Its volatile secure storage
includes PCRs (Platform Configuration Registers) where the
run-time measurement can be stored and matched with. They
can not be directly accessed but only extended (i.e., replaced
with the cryptographic hash value of its original value con-
catenated with the new measurement). Its non-volatile secure
storage is called NVRAM, which is accessible in the form of
index (a numeric identifier). NVRAM indices can be allocated
and deallocated and there can be multiple of them.
Sealing. Short for cryptographic sealing, it is a special mode
of encryption, provided by TEEs/SE, where the key is tied
347 CPUs released in 2018 as of Dec. 6 (ark.intel.com).
(in various ways) largely to the machine state, in the form
of measurement. Measurement is the chaining of the loaded
programs in sequence, e.g., concatenation of hashed values
in the SE. Any single bit of change in loaded programs will
cause a mismatch of measurement, making the reproduced key
different, and thus render the decryption (unsealing) to fail. In
this way, platform binding is achieved.
Flicker [42]. Before the introduction of Flicker, Intel TXT was
mostly applied with the pilot project tboot, which deals with
boot-time trusted execution (cf. OSLO [28] for AMD SVM).
The ability to switch between the regular OS environment
and the trusted execution was not available. Flicker enables
such transitions, e.g., interrupting and saving states for the OS,
initiating the TXT/SVM session, performing trusted operations
and resuming the OS. The trusted operations are encapsulated
in what is called a PAL (Piece of Application Logic) and thus
OS-agnostic. It satisfies what is needed in Inuksuk.
Self-Encrypting Drive. With the same interface and form
factor, regular hard drives or SSDs can be equipped with a
built-in crypto engine and certain enhancement to the con-
troller, thus providing on-device encryption and access control.
Such devices are called Self-Encrypting Drives (SEDs) [8].
Instead of more generic secure processing, functionalities are
mainly related to media access control and data encryption
(e.g., with the so-called Device Encryption Key). Most SEDs
offer fine-grained protection, such as dividing media space
into ranges and splitting read/write accesses. In addition to
the standard ATA interface, Trusted Computing Group (TCG)
also has its open standard named Opal/Opal2 [69] for SEDs.
What Inuksuk needs is the fine-grained programmable write
protection enforcement (data secrecy not as a goal).
III. THREAT MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
1) We assume that malware/ransomware can acquire the
highest software privileges on a system (e.g., root/ad-
min or even ring-0 on x86), through any traditional
mechanisms (often used by rootkits), including: known
but unpatched vulnerabilities, zero-day vulnerabilities, and
social-engineering. Root-level access allows malware to
control devices (e.g., keyboard, network interface), GUI,
installation/removal of device drivers.
2) Before deployment of Inuksuk, the user system is not
infected by any malware. We primarily protect preexisting
data at the time of malware/ransomware infection, and
provide best-effort protection thereafter for later added/up-
dated files until the malware/ransomware is detected (or a
ransom is demanded).
3) We do not detect/stop the execution of malware, or identify
its actions. Instead, we protect integrity of user data on a
protected partition and ensure data accessibility. If the OS
is completely corrupted or inoperable, the user can install
a new OS copy or boot from another media (e.g., USB)
to access her data.
4) In the specific case of ransomware, we deal with the most
common variants (i.e., cryptoviral extortion), and exclude
those that simply lock access to system resources without
using encryption (non-encrypting ransomware [52]) or
deletion, and those that threaten to publish information
stolen from the user (doxware or leakware [50]).
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5) We assume all hardware (e.g., the CPU/chipset and
the storage device), microcode/firmware and other
architecture-shipped modules (e.g., TXT’s SINIT, see Sec-
tion II) are properly implemented by the manufactures,
and the user is motivated to choose a system with no
known flaws. An example of such a flaw is a series
of recently identified implementation bugs [43] in SED
firmware implementations that highly affect data secrecy
(refer to Section VI for details).
6) Attacks requiring physical access are excluded (e.g., no
evil-maid attacks). We only consider a computer system
potentially infected by malware/ransomware from the net-
work or a removable drive.
7) We assume that after infection, ransomware will act im-
mediately; i.e., it will find target user files, encrypt them,
and then demand a ransom without much delay (e.g.,
few minutes/hours, cf. [24] vs. months). If the attacker
waits, he risks of losing control, e.g., through an OS/anti-
malware update. With every patched computer, the attacker
loses money, and thus cannot remain hidden for long. To
accumulate file updates, the attacker may wait for some
time (i.e., long enough to collect sufficient content that the
user may care), before asking for the ransom. We term
such attacks as persistent ransomware, and discuss them
more in Section VI, item (d).
IV. DESIGN
We first define our design goals for Inuksuk, then explore
available/possible choices with one or multiple TEEs placed at
different locations of the storage data flow and their implica-
tions; we illustrate our generalized design and its workflow by
choosing readily available COTS options. We explain certain
technical challenges/choices in Section V. The discussion will
start with and be based on the stand-alone mode of Inuksuk.
The network-based mode, which follows, just shifts the stand-
alone complex of TXT/SVM, TPM and SED to a network
location. The terms ransomware and malware in our setting of
unauthorized data alteration can be interchangeably used.
A. Design goals
We list our goals, and briefly sketch the key ideas to fulfill
such goals in Inuksuk.
a) Enforcement by device. Rootkit malware must not be
able to modify or delete protected files. We place them in a
write-protected mode (read-only) all the time in the user OS.
The write protection must not be bypassed or broken by rootkit
and thus it must be enforced by the storage device, where the
protected partition resides, instead of any software on the host.
Therefore, without the appropriate authentication key (a high-
entropy random value, e.g., 256-bit long), the partition cannot
be unlocked, even if the OS is compromised (malware gains
all software permissions).
b) TEE-aided write protection. To allow updates, lifting the
write protection is inevitable at a certain point in time, during
which protected files can be compromised by rootkit malware.
In Inuksuk, write operations to the protected partition only
occur inside a TEE. The authentication key is protected by, and
bound to, this TEE (inaccessible from outside). All changes
are treated as new versions (retaining historical versions) and
infrequent (batch) deletions are performed with user interaction
or through policies.
c) Minimal application interference. Applications (includ-
ing the user OS) should operate as is. As the original files
are untouched by Inuksuk and accessed the same way by
applications, normal application I/O is not hindered (even for
direct I/O as in disk utilities). File copies on the protected
partition are available as read-only, which should not concern
regular applications.
d) Minimal user involvement. User experience should not
be significantly affected. A normal user experience is preserved
in Inuksuk with the separation of the original and protected
copies. To reduce system unavailability for the stand-alone
mode, the update/commit process should be scheduled during
idle hours, and all updates to the original copy are cached to
be committed as a new version periodically (e.g., every 8–12
hours). The user can also choose the network-based mode as
discussed in Section IV-F to avoid unavailability. The user is
involved only when files must be deleted (sometimes including
removal of old versions), and manually triggering Inuksuk (for
immediate commitment of cached files, when the important
files are just edited/added).
Non-goals. Inuksuk is designed to act more like a data vault
than a traditional backup system; e.g., we commit user data
a few times a day in batches, instead of syncing updates
instantly. Also, it adds another layer of protection to high-value
user data, complementing existing backup systems. Namely,
OS/application binaries should not reside on the protected
partitions; regular user data may already be backed up (e.g.,
to certain cloud storage). We provide robust data integrity
against advanced attacks at the expense of losing some data
due to ransomware attacks (e.g., user updates to a file during
the commit period). Also, data confidentiality is currently
a non-goal (to facilitate unhindered operations of common
applications); i.e., the ransomware can read all protected user
data, and read/modify the OS/unprotected partitions. However,
confidentiality and controlled read access can be easily sup-
ported; e.g., encrypting data under Inuksuk-protected keys, and
enabling password-based access control for read operations on
selected files.
B. Trusted file versioning
We treat all write operations to the original copy (consol-
idated in one commit) as adding new files to the protected
partition (automatically approved, similar to S4 [60]), which
poses no threat to existing files, leaving only solicited file
deletion (as opposed to version deletion) with user interven-
tion. Any committed update to an existing file creates a new
version, instead of overwriting the current version (the latest
one being under the original file name) so that historical
changes committed are all retained on the protected partition.
For space management, we leave it to the user to either clean
up in the mini file browser we developed (see Section V-E
for details), or configure an auto-deletion policy based on
aging (e.g., after 1–2 years) or version-limiting (e.g., maximum
100 versions). The eventual choice is largely determined by
the user’s budget and needs. Our simple versioning may not
impose a significant burden on the storage space, considering:
a) We commit changes to the protected partition through
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scheduled invocation of Inuksuk; users can explicitly trigger
the updater to commit important changes immediately, which
we believe would be infrequent. So the number of versions
that will be stored for a continuously updated file would still
be limited, e.g., 1–4 times a day. Auto-save in applications or
file access-time change do not trigger an update (it is only on
the original copy). b) Nowadays, disk storage is less costly
and user computers are usually over-provisioned. To improve
storage utilization, specifically for large files, more space-
efficient versioning algorithms may be adopted (e.g., S4 [60]).
Also, refer to the file selection principles discussed below for
optimal scenarios.
User consent is mandatory when files (as opposed to
versions) are to be deleted. File versions can optionally be
deleted manually by the user. We allow deletion operations in
the mini file browser within the trusted environment, where
the user is asked to select explicitly which file(s) to delete.
User consent is not needed in the case of auto-deletion of
versions. Direct file deletion in the protected partition outside
the trusted environment will be ignored; deletion of the original
copy in the unprotected partition will not be synchronized to
the protected partition. We also hide old versions from the user
OS to help usability. When a new version is committed, we
rename the previous copy by appending its timestamp with the
file name, and keep the new version with the original name.
Automatic stale version deletion. To relieve users from delet-
ing unnecessary old versions of the same file, Inuksuk can be
configured to automatically delete such versions after a certain
time (aging) or number of versions (version-limiting). The
retention duration should be long enough to hurt ransomware’s
business model. For example, if an attacker needs to wait more
than a year to monetize his ransomware, it might become
much less attractive than now. Defenders are likely to generate
reliable detection mechanisms (e.g., signatures) within the wait
period, and even be able to identify the attackers. Calculation
of the time duration (for aging) must be done appropriately,
if there is no trusted time source available within the TEE
(e.g., TXT/SVM). As rootkits can change system time, file
creation/update time as available from the user OS file system
cannot be trusted. A simple solution could be to use digitally
signed time value from an NTP service,4 where the signature
verification is done within the TEE. The signed value can
be obtained through the user OS, and must be sent for each
file commit session. The trusted updater must store the last
accepted signed value along with NTP verification keys, and
check the new timestamp to detect replay (the time value
should always be increasing).
File selection principles. Although technically we are not
restricted in terms of file types, to optimize the user’s budget
and needs, the user is recommended to follow a few principles:
• Targeted. The user identifies what she cannot afford to
lose (must pay ransom for). For example, an HD movie
of 5GB that can always be redownloaded should not be
selected for protection. However, we do consider such
valid needs (e.g., of a movie editor), where corresponding
high-capacity disk space is assumed affordable.
4See Section 6.2.2 at http://www.ntp.org/ntpfaq/NTP-s-config-adv.htm. Al-
ternatively, time-stamping services, implemented by several CAs (following
RFC 3161), can also be used.
• Minimal. The user should reduce redundancy from the
selected files. For instance, a mobile app developer may
have (multiple copies of) the Android source tree (tens of
GBs) which she compiles a couple of times a day. The
files changed by compilation are not necessarily those
she cannot afford to reproduce. Therefore, she may just
choose source files reflecting her work.
• Prioritized. For instance, the update frequency for an
important project report (e.g., 1–3MB) should be set
higher in the policy than the user’s favorite songs (e.g.,
MP3s, 300MB).
C. TEE placements
Based on our design goals, Inuksuk can be hypothetically
constructed around the following entities:
1) Host. The processor-centric system where software (in-
cluding user applications) runs and where data is gener-
ated/consumed. Benign and malicious operations cannot
be naturally distinguished.
2) Disk. The storage device where legitimate user data (from
user applications) is supposed to be securely stored.
No additional mechanism other than physical safety is
assumed.
3) TEE. There might be multiple TEEs. They can be
equipped on either the Host or the Disk, or both. The TEE
has the properties and purposes discussed in Section II. In
light of the Disk’s constraints, we further model all TEEs
for three types of functionalities: I) Policies. This applies
to general-purpose TEEs (as with that of the Host), where
the user/vendor can provision arbitrary storage rules,
e.g., write protection. II) Authentication. We consider
the most constrained application-specific TEEs on the
Disk to be able to authenticate commands from the Host
with a configured secret, e.g., a TLS certificate and/or a
password. III) Secure protocol. A secure communication
protocol between the Host and the Disk may be supported
(in addition to authentication), which ensures integrity and
confidentiality, e.g., the untrusted OS cannot learn what
is being sent and if it tries to manipulate the data it will
be detected.
4) Interface. This is how the Disk is connected to the Host
physically, as exemplified by SATA, USB and Ethernet.
We consider both secure and insecure interfaces.5 In a
threat model with no physical access, direct links with
endpoints inside the TEE can be treated as secure. Oth-
erwise, for example, Ethernet (WAN, where other nodes
are involved) or SATA relying on untrusted kernel drivers
is susceptible to interception. A secure interface cannot
provide message authenticity if it is not dedicated to
the TEE. For instance, outside the TEE (for concurrent
TEEs) or when the TEE is not active (for exclusive TEEs),
untrusted software on the Host can still send anything to
the Disk, unless there is a way to block access (e.g., with
the TrustZone protection controller [10]) to the Interface
from untrusted software at all times.
The storage data flow goes between the Host and the Disk
through the Interface. The TEE’s location can shift along
5A secure interface ensures data integrity and confidentiality (but not
necessarily authenticity) in the discussion hereinafter.
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the data flow across different entities. In addition to the
autonomous enforcement of predefined policies (e.g., append-
only), certain administrative access to the Disk is also needed
for space management, i.e., there must be a convenient way
for the user to delete files or change the configuration. In
the following, we consider a few possible constructions with
different TEE placements. We use the subscript to indicate
where the TEE resides, e.g., TEEDisk means a TEE is on the
Disk.
TEEDisk alone. If TEEDisk enforces the append-only and
history-preserving logic on its own, TEEHost is not necessary.
Figure 1-a depicts this construction. However, it lacks a trusted
user interface for the administrative access. This might be
solved by adding 1) a physical switch, to allow occasional full
access, or 2) a secondary dedicated interface, assuming there
exists a trusted host for performing administrative tasks. There-
fore, we do not consider this construction for our prototype.
TEEHost + secure Interface. In contrast to TEEDisk alone, if
there is only TEEHost enforcing the logic, regardless of whether
the Interface is secure or not, our goals still cannot be achieved.
For insecure Interface, malicious enitity can directly intercept
traffic and corrupt data. For secure Interface, which might seem
sufficient for channel integrity and secrecy, untrusted software
on the Host can also do harm at the data origin. When TEEHost
is not in control, other privileged code can access the secure
Interface and modify/delete the stored data. The root cause is
that the Disk has no TEE to authenticate TEEHost.
TEEHost + dedicated secure Interface. On top of the con-
struction above, if TEEHost comes with an I/O partitioning
mechanism (e.g., the TrustZone protection controller), the
secure interface can be configured in a way that when an
exclusive TEEHost is not active or outside a concurrent TEEHost,
no software can access it (Figure 1-b). As an advantage,
this allows any storage device to be used as the Disk. Also,
with TEEHost, the administrative access can be provided to
the user. This construction may become feasible in the future
when ARM-based desktop/laptop computers can efficiently run
modern desktop OSes [45].
TEEHost + TEEDisk + insecure Interface. As TEEDisk is
usually not general-purpose (i.e., supporting arbitrary code to
be provisioned), we need TEEHost to be used in conjunction to
achieve our purpose. A minimum support from such TEEDisk
is the use of certain secret for encryption or access control
(e.g., SED and Kinetic storage), which can serve as the
basis for write protection (read-only). If TEEDisk supports a
secure communication protocol, e.g., TLS, a secure Interface
is unnecessary. In this case, as long as the shared secret (or its
public-key equivalent) is properly handled in TEEHost, a secure
channel is formed, equivalent to a secure Interface. TEEHost
enforces all the logic. Note that unprivileged TEEs (see Sec-
tion II) can be used here, since the requirement for a secure
Interface has been relaxed. See Figure 1-c for an illustration.
This corresponds to the construction of Pesos [33], as detailed
in Section VII. This construction is also missing a trusted
UI for administrative access (forged input can be entered in
TEEHost thus deleting unintended files), as unprivileged TEE
only interacts with the user through the untrusted OS.
TEEHost + TEEDisk + secure Interface. Peripherals directly
connected to a PC with exclusive/privileged TEEHost is con-
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Fig. 1: Example constructions with varying TEE placements.
An Interface arrow not terminating inside TEEHost means the
TEE is unprivileged and relies on other software (e.g., the
OS) to perform I/O. Privileged TEEs (with the arrow inside)
only own Interface when active, hence the need for certain I/O
partitioning (e.g., TZPC) to block it to other software when the
TEE is not active, making Interface dedicated
sidered to have secure Interface. In this case, TEEDisk that
does not support a secure communication protocol is applicable
(e.g., Opal SED). TEEDisk authenticates TEEHost in cleartext;
this could be problematic if attackers gain physical access
or TEEHost is non-exclusive/unprivileged. Privileged TEEHost
provides a trusted UI for administrative access (forged UI
outside TEEHost cannot be authenticated by TEEDisk without
the secret). We choose this construction to implement Inuksuk;
see Figure 1-d.
D. Design choices
According to the discussion above, we expand on further
considerations and requirements on the chosen construction of
TEEHost + TEEDisk + secure Interface. Note that the design
choices are only based on available COTS devices for this
prototype. The high-level design is generalizable to other
TEEHost and TEEDisk (as shown in Section IV-C).
Host-side TEE. To satisfy secure Interface, TEEHost must be
privileged (Figure 1-d); otherwise, the OS may manipulate
the I/O traffic. Also, our observation shows that if a TEE
is privileged, it is usually exclusive (i.e., not allowing other
software to run in parallel) unless there is hardware I/O parti-
tioning as with ARM TZPC, to avoid resource access conflict
or contention. Actually, as an advantage with privileged TEEs,
no other applications (including the OS) can have the chance
to even observe what is running inside, as anything else is
discarded/suspended, avoiding software side-channel attacks.
We use Intel TXT/AMD SVM as the host-side TEE for
Inuksuk. Therefore, our discussion hereinafter will refer to
TEEHost as TXT/SVM. The more recent Intel SGX does not
run privileged code for I/O access.6
Programmable write protection. As the ideal TEEDisk (a
general-purpose on-disk TEE, Figure 1-a) is unavailable (as
of writing), and it also lacks a proper trusted UI on the Host
for administrative access, we resort to storage devices with an
6 SGX has also faced several side-channel attacks due to its concurrent
nature, e.g., Foreshadow [11], Branch Shadowing [36], and cache attacks [20].
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application-specific TEE. TEEDisk needs to be able to commu-
nicate with TEEHost for the write protection (programmability).
We expose write access to the protected partition only inside
TEEHost. Some off-the-shelf secure USB drives offer write
protection [4]. However, it is either in the form of a physical
switch/button to be pressed by the user, or a key pad on the
USB device itself, where a password can be typed (like a
closed TEE inaccessible from outside).
The self-encrypting drive (SED, see Section II) satisfies
programmability, with one or more secrets for authentication
or media encryption. Also, SED has the advantage of
supporting fine-grained protection ranges with separate
read/write permissions, which is important as we constantly
allow read access, and deny write access from the user OS.
Fine protection granularity also allows the protected partition
to coexist with the unprotected OS and other files in the
same drive, instead of requiring a dedicated disk. The only
disadvantage, as far as Inuksuk is concerned, is that SED does
not support secure communication protocols thus requiring
a secure Interface. The legacy ATA Security password can
also be considered device-enforced write protection (without
media encryption). However, it is a non-solution for Inuksuk,
because only one-way locked-to-unlocked transition is allowed
(SEC4:SEC5 [62, p. 13]), i.e., relocking requires power reset,
whereas Inuksuk needs the ability to switch back and forth.
Minimal TCB. Although a full-fledged OS in TXT/SVM (e.g.,
tboot with Ubuntu) can be used to perform trusted operations,
it is preferable to keep a minimal trusted computing base
(TCB), for both auditability (e.g., avoiding numerous complex
components) and maintainability (e.g., avoiding measuring
large and varying files). Moreover, it is technically more
involving, because the trusted operations occur in the midst of
an active user OS execution (considering the time/effort needed
to save and restore various states for both OSes). Therefore,
we develop our own logic as a small-footprint, native program
in TXT/SVM with no external dependencies.
Separation of the protected partition from the original.
Technically, we can write file updates immediately on the
protected partition. However, unsolicited/frequent write
attempts, such as updates from the automatic save feature
in text editors (i.e., not initiated by the user clicking on the
“Save” button), will create too many versions on the protected
partition and make the system unusable due to frequent
switch between regular and trusted environments; note that,
TXT/SVM is exclusive, and writing file updates may also
take noticeable time. Therefore, we leave user-selected files
where they are, and make a copy onto the protected partition
on the SED. All subsequent updates happen to the original
files without write protection. The user can then decide when
to commit changes to the protected partition (no versioning
on the original partition), manually, or automatically at certain
intervals (e.g., every 8-12 hours).
File-system in TXT/SVM. For protected write operations,
we cannot simply pass the raw sector information (sector
number, offset, number of bytes and the buffer) to TXT/SVM
as we perform file-based operations, and the user also must
select files (not sectors) for deletion. Therefore, the TXT/SVM
program must be equipped with a file system.
Data mobility and recovery. The SED can also contain an
unprotected partition where the OS resides, because of the fine
granularity of protection ranges, while sometimes users may
treat it as a stand-alone data drive. In either case, when data
recovery is needed (e.g., the OS is corrupted or compromised),
the user can simply reboot from different media on the same
machine or mount the SED on a different machine. The data
will be readily accessible as read-only, hence aiding data
mobility, thanks to the separation of read and write accesses.
In case the user needs to update the files, a rescue USB, where
all intact Inuksuk binaries are stored as well as a portable OS
can be used to boot the same computer (where Inuksuk was
provisioned). After booting with the rescue drive, the user can
invoke the same updater in TXT/SVM for regular file access
or deprovisioning (to remove the write protection).
E. System components and workflow
Refer to Figure 2 for an overview of our design. The system
consists of the following components at a higher level (further
technical details are discussed in Section V):
• Trusted updater. This is the core component of Inuksuk,
and runs inside TXT/SVM. It is responsible for copying
files from the original partition to the protected partition (in
SED write access mode) as new versions, file listing (in a
mini file browser), and showing file meta data to the user.
Files in the original partition are selected to commit based
on their last-modified timestamp.
• TPM. In conjunction with TXT/SVM, TPM makes sure
that the secret (the SED password) is securely stored in
its NVRAM storage, and can be unsealed only if the
unmodified trusted updater is executed (as measured in
TPM’s platform configuration registers).
• Secure drive. An SED drive hosts the protected partition.
Without the high-entropy key/password, its protection (i.e.,
write protection in our case) cannot be bypassed. Note that
even with physical access to the drive, reinitializing the
drive with the PSID (physical secure ID) printed on it will
have all data lost.
• OS drivers. A few OS-dependent modules are needed
to bridge the user, OS and the trusted updater, such as
preparing the TXT/SVM environment. These modules do
not have to be trusted after initial deployment, as the worst
case is a DoS attack; see also Section VI, item (b).
Update policies. The update policies reflect user preferences
and control how the trusted updater behaves (as primitive
text files in the prototype for now), e.g., the age threshold,
version limit, maximum file size, scheduled interval, etc.
Moreover, the user can optionally configure certain checks
to be enforced in TEE for the purpose of anomaly detection,
e.g., ransomware maliciously triggered 100 versions of a
protected file. At each run, a report is generated securely in
TEE, e.g., showing a list of updated files.
The policies are sealed on the protected partition (can only
be unsealed inside TXT/SVM). A plaintext copy is left on
the unprotected partition for certain operations (e.g., scheduled
updates based on an interval). Once in the trusted updater, the
unsealed copy of policy can be used to verify the action’s
correctness (e.g., manipulated interval outside).
Workflow. The generalized workflow of Inuksuk is as follows:
(a) At deployment time, a high-entropy secret is generated as
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Fig. 2: System overview
the SED password and sealed into TPM (can only be unsealed
in the genuine trusted updater). (b) The protected partition is
created with the SED write protection. The user also selects the
files to be protected, which are then copied to the protected par-
tition in the first invocation of the updater. After the first-time
copying, the user still interacts directly with her files on the
original partition. (c) In everyday use, the protected partition
is never touched (except for read-only access). As with certain
cloud storage services, we use an icon on the original files to
indicate which ones are under the protection of Inuksuk. (d) If
the user adds or updates files on the original partition and is
ready to commit her changes, she triggers the trusted updater,
and without involving her to verify, changes are committed as
new files/versions on the protected partition. The updater is
triggered either manually, or automatically, e.g., via scheduled
tasks, when the updating-application is closed, or when the
system is restarting or shutting down. (e) When the user wants
to delete files or old file-versions, she can manually trigger the
updater to open a mini file browser, and make the selections.
F. Network-based data vault
The functionality of Inuksuk does not rely on any third par-
ties (except the device manufacturer), as the trust is anchored in
hardware/firmware and all its components are local. Although
our explanation of Inuksuk is based on its stand-alone mode,
there is no fundamental barrier in the design for it to be
deployed as a remote/networked data vault. To provide users
with a centralized network-based mode, as well as extending
for enterprise and cloud storage services, we briefly explore a
variant of Inuksuk where the key components, i.e., TXT/SVM
CPU, TPM and SED, are shifted to a network location, forming
a remote service. Users’ data will remain protected at a central,
Inuksuk-backed storage service, and users can keep using any
device of their choice (i.e., with or without TEE, mobile
or desktop, at home or in an enterprise). We believe that
this variant can be used to protect security-sensitive/user files
stored in cloud storage services like Dropbox and OneDrive,
or enterprise storage services. Although such services are
possibly backed by robust backup measures and strict security
policies/tools, if infected, consequences can be high.
The construction goes as follows: any desktop/laptop/mo-
bile device serves as the front-end directly used by the user.
Through an account, the front-end is connected to a storage
back-end, which plays the role of the “original partition” in
our stand-alone setup, caching file updates. Eventually, an
Inuksuk-equipped backup server, which has the TXT/SVM-
capable CPU and chipset, as well as the SED (or more likely,
an SED array), is connected with the storage back-end. The
Inuksuk-server will periodically copy new/updated files from
the storage server, and become unavailable during this period,
which should not affect functionality, assuming the Inuksuk-
server is not used for other purposes. The storage back-end
and user devices remain available all the time.
Once deployed correctly, without the high-entropy key
sealed in TPM, no remote attacker can turn off the write
protection and update/delete the protected files. Our threat
model now assumes that the remote attacker can infect the
storage and Inuksuk servers, in addition to user devices. As
before, only the uncommitted files remain vulnerable, and after
written to the Inuksuk protected storage, user files become
safe against any data modification attacks. Content on the
Inuksuk-equipped server can be maintained by enterprise IT
administrators (e.g., for deleting old versions). The whole
process is transparent to end-users/employees, and the files
that need ransomware protection can be identified by enterprise
policies. In the case of home users, the storage back-end and
the Inuksuk-equipped server can physically reside on the same
NAS (Network Attached Storage) device, assuming certain
disruptions are tolerable.
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
We have implemented Inuksuk for Windows 7 non-PAE,
Windows 10 64-bit and Ubuntu 12.04. In this section, we
discuss important technical considerations and choices, as
well as performance evaluation/issues during the prototype
implementation. Our techniques can also be useful for other
OS-less I/O intensive TXT/SVM applications. We perform our
development and testing on an Intel Core i7-2600 @3.40GHz
(and AMD FX-8350 8-Core @4.0 GHz), 16GB RAM, and
Seagate ST500LT025 SED disk. The performance numbers
are from the Intel machine. Also a few other computers are
used for debugging and cross-validation. As an estimate of
the TCB size, in addition to Flicker’s codebase (2012-06-
18, v0.7), Inuksuk adds 5190 LoC (in the PAL, which runs
in TXT/SVM, OS drivers excluded). Among this, fat_io_lib
contributed 1852 (for FAT32), followed by TCG Opal (1507)
and USB (1467). We used the tool LocMetrics [37] to count the
lines with some trivial manual effort. There are also additional
engineering-oriented technical details omitted here for brevity,
such as resource handsoff with the OS for secure user interface
(keyboard and display).
A. Porting and using Flicker for TXT/SVM sessions
Since Inuksuk’s secure file operations occur alongside the
user OS, a mechanism is required for jumping back and
forth between the trusted updater and the user OS. It can be
implemented as a device driver (in the user OS) dealing with
parameters, saving the current OS state, processing TXT/SVM
logic, and restoring the saved OS state when returned from the
trusted updater. Several such operations are already handled in
Flicker [42] (also refer to Section II), which we use as the
base of our prototype.
Flicker supports only 32-bit non-PAE Linux and Windows
7 OSes (no update since 2012), which is a limitation for our
prototype with modern 64-bit systems. We thus port Flicker to
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the latest Windows 10 64-bit, which may benefit the commu-
nity for other in-OS secure processing with device I/O, or when
the exclusive processing environment of TXT/SVM is desired
(as opposed to other TEEs such as SGX and TrustZone).
Similar to the 32-bit Flicker, our adaptation, especially for
context saving/restoring, is also mostly based on heuristics,
as the available Intel/AMD documentation does not specify
what is preserved or affected by TXT/SVM. Here, we omit
the technical challenges for this porting, for example, the 4-
level unity page table covering both physical and virtual, 32-
bit and 64-bit addresses; 64-bit context saving/restoring; the
discontinued inline assembly, etc. Note that this process is far
more complex than adapting user-space applications or kernel
drivers/modules for 64-bit.
B. Opal access to SED inside TXT
All software outside TXT/SVM, including the OS and all
its device drivers, is untrusted in Inuksuk. However, inside the
TXT/SVM environment, there is no run-time device support,
i.e., devices including any SED drive cannot be accessed
by default. Therefore, we must implement standalone (and
preferably lightweight, to limit the TCB size) custom driver
for accessing SED devices inside TXT/SVM. Various SED
protocols rely eventually on the SATA interface (ATA Com-
mand Set [65]), with two options to choose from: 1) ATA
Security password [62] (e.g., prompted in BIOS at bootup). In
this option, SEDs only differ with regular hard drives in that
user data is encrypted on the media. 2) Dedicated security
protocols (e.g., Seagate DriveTrust [56], IEEE 1667 [25] and
Microsoft eDrive (all based on TCG Opal/Opal2 [67]). They
implement support for multiple roles/users corresponding to
multiple ranges, with separate passwords for write/read access.
Granularity in both protection ranges, and separate read-
/write permissions is important in our design. The same drive
can host both protected and unprotected partitions (which
cannot be achieved in Option 1). Thus Option 2 is more suited
for our needs, and we choose to use TCG Opal to communicate
with SED, as it is an open standard and widely supported by
most devices. Actually, with TCG Opal we can define multiple
ranges (corresponding to partitions) protected by different se-
crets. Then these secrets can be sealed with different programs
(e.g., the updater is one) thus reducing the risk of exposing
all protected data altogether as in a single point of failure.
We leave this as future work. Note that Opal is merely the
payload security protocol (SFSC) of the carrying interface, be
it SATA or NVMe; NVMe supports two variants of TCG Opal,
Opalite and Pyrite [68]. We anticipate that supporting NVMe
(for higher performance) may require only trivial changes.
A few open-sourced tools can manipulate SED devices with
OS support (in addition to proprietary tools for vendor-specific
protocols); we have tested msed [53] (now merged into DTA
sedutil [15]) and topaz-alpha [3]. They mainly rely on the
I/O support from the OS, e.g., SCSI Generic I/O, in the ATA
passthrough mode. However, our TXT/SVM PAL is OS-less
with no run-time support. We decide to port functions from
topaz-alpha [3] as needed. The porting process faces several
engineering challenges, which we omit here for brevity.
C. File system efficiency
We handle updates to the protected partition at file-level
instead of raw sectors (see Section IV). This requires at
least basic file system functionalities implemented within TX-
T/SVM. To avoid rework, we tested several libraries, including
fat_io_lib [1], ThinFAT32 [61], fedit [18], efsl [80], etc. FAT32
projects that are tightly coupled with external dependencies
are excluded (e.g., the mainstream FAT32 support with Linux
VFS inodes). But none satisfies both the two necessary
features: 1) Buffering support. Usually, FAT32 access is sector-
wise, while DMA requests need to handle as many sectors
as possible to reduce per-request overhead. PIO access is not
affected but it is by nature slow. Note that hardcoded pre-
fetching for reads is an overkill (reading data never needed),
and hardcoded write buffer will hang (waiting for enough num-
ber of sectors). 2) Multi-cluster support for space allocation.
At the file creation time, and when a file grows in size, FAT32
must traverse all clusters to find free clusters to be appended
to the cluster chain of the file. Interestingly, with all FAT32
projects we tested, only one cluster is allowed to be added (we
do not see any performance problem for allowing multiple).
Therefore, for a 50MB file taking 6400 clusters (8KB cluster-
size) and the partition having 131072 free clusters (1GB), it
takes more than 800 million iterations.
We choose fat_io_lib for adaptation, because of its good
buffering performance. To add multi-cluster support, for each
iteration, we start with the cluster where we left off, instead
of the first cluster of the partition. We emphasize that Inuksuk
is not dependent on any specific file system, and thus FAT32
can be replaced with a more efficient one.
D. Discussion on DMA inside TXT
The necessity for Direct Memory Access (DMA) is
ubiquitous, even for a light-weight program like the Inuksuk
updater. For instance, USB keyboards are the defacto norm.
Unlike other simpler protocols, the controller (e.g., EHCI [70])
requires several host-allocated buffers in the main memory
(DMA chunks) for basic communication with the host (e.g.,
the periodic frame list). The controller accesses the buffers
without the CPU’s intervention, hence, direct memory access.
Also, for data transfer to/from the hard drive (e.g., SED),
The theoretical speed of ATA PIO modes [6] is very low.
Taking into account the file system overhead, it needs 3–4
minutes to write a 100MB file, which is unacceptable from
the user-experience perspective. In modern systems, DMA is
usually enabled for disk access.
However, the fundamental protection of TXT (like all other
TEEs) must prevent autonomous access from peripherals for
the protected regions. The MLE (Measured Launch Environ-
ment, specific to Intel TXT) memory is included in either the
DMA Protected Range (DPR) or Protected Memory Regions
(PMRs), which is mandatory (cf. [26]). Consequently, since
we cannot (and do not want to) exclude the MLE from DMA
protection, we have to allocate the DMA chunks outside. In our
specific case where physical attacks are excluded and no other
code is running in parallel, exposing DMA regions outside the
MLE does not pose a threat (more in Section VI, item (e)).
In this way, we implement our custom DMA support for
both the USB keyboard and ATA DMA controller for data
9
Fig. 3: A screenshot of the mini file browser inside the trusted
updater. Selected files are designated with “»”; group selection
can be specified by the first and last files.
transfer. We also support PS/2 keyboard. Usually, DMA relies
on interrupts, i.e., when the transfer is done, the interrupt
handler will be notified to proceed to the next request
(e.g., to maximize CPU time utilization in a multitasking
environment). In our case, Flicker is not supposed to work
with an interrupt-enabled workload (technically possible
with some complex adaptation), and we merely need the
performance boost through DMA, i.e., no multi-tasking and
thus, requiring no interrupt support. Therefore, our custom
DMA support works with polling. With DMA enabled, file
transfer in the Inuksuk updater is 50–100 times faster than
using just PIO (see Section V-E).
E. Measuring disruptions
Inuksuk does not introduce run-time performance overhead
for user applications. However, when updates are being com-
mitted to the protected partition (file copying), the computer
will be unavailable for regular tasks, due to TXT/SVM’s
exclusiveness. Such disruption is determined by both the file
I/O performance and various factors, e.g., the file count/size.
It mainly comes from data transfer for new versions, i.e.,
created/modified files. Deletion involves only flagging the files
as deleted in the file system, and thus is quick. We have devel-
oped a light-weight file browser inside the trusted updater that
allows the user to choose multiple files for deletion; see Fig. 3.
With more engineering effort, graphical interface can also be
created. There is no technical limitation for creating custom
UI within TXT/SVM. Also recall that by configuring Inuksuk
in the network-based mode, such disruption can be mitigated.
The discussion here only focuses on the stand-alone mode.
File I/O evaluation. The file transfer speed determines the
duration of disruptions, and affects user experience. However,
we argue that the way we implemented DMA and our choice of
the FAT32 library (as well as our adaptation to it) are confined
by the engineering effort and time. Therefore, the numbers we
show here should be just the lower bounds.
As micro-benchmarking, we executed 10 measurements on
the files we selected with fixed sizes; see Table I. They are
all one-way access, write-new/write-existing/read respectively.
50MB represents common media files and 500KB represents
miscellaneous files of trivial sizes. Note that without our adap-
tation to enable multi-cluster allocation support, the creation
of a 50MB file can be done only between 0.5–1MB/s, while
overwriting of an existing file of the same size runs at about
Write/Existing Write/New Read OS Penalty
50MB file Mean 43.93 41.69 32.17 68.77 53%SD 3.40 0.31 0.09
Mean 26.46 8.09 16.67 14.29 43%500KB file SD 1.18 0.43 5.26
TABLE I: File transfer performance (MB/s) in the trusted
updater from 10 measurements. For small files (e.g., 500KB),
other overhead predominates the transfer time.
40MB/s. To have a rough comparison with regular file transfer
performance, we also list the corresponding speed in Windows
aside (a 10-time average of reads and writes). The overhead
percentage is calculated with the lowest speed of Inuksuk
divided by the corresponding Windows value.
To demonstrate Inuksuk’s performance in a realistic usage
scenario, we invoke the trusted updater to copy 50 random
photos (JPG files, size ranging from 1009KB to 2416KB,
totaling 85.6MB) from the original partition to the protected
partition. We measured the duration for 10 times, and the
performance seems reasonable (mean: 23.3853 seconds), and
relatively stable (standard deviation: 0.58989). This is a combi-
nation of read, write, file opening/closing, accumulating space
fragments, etc. We also evaluated only the transition time
between the OS and trusted updater. It varies between 2–4
seconds, including screen mode switching.
If we take into account any extra processing during file
transfer, the time needed may also be affected. The basic
versioning Inuksuk uses is not incremental, i.e., the whole of
the source file on the original partition is copied over to the
protected partition as a new version. We may consider some
open-source version control systems like SVN/Git (or even
the simple diff command) for incremental versions to save
disk space. However, in that case, each time new files/updates
are committed, the updater must scan the whole of both
files for differences and then perform the transfer. Moreover,
deletion is supposed to be very quick with non-incremental
versioning (just flagging the file); with diff-like versioning,
for each file the updater has to reassemble from all previous
versions to form the latest one to be kept. The overhead could
be significant in our setting (considering batch-deletion of
versions). Also, for common file types such as images, videos,
and rich documents (e.g., PDF, Word), incremental versioning
may not save much disk space.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we list various potential attack vectors, and
discuss how they are addressed, or why they do not pose a
threat (see Section III for our assumptions).
Since we shift the defense from detection/recovery to data
loss prevention, we avoid common attacks such as whether
new malware/ransomware can evade detection, whether it
does privilege escalation, and how the encryption keys are
generated. There are two basic questions in evaluating Inuk-
suk’s effectiveness: 1) Outside the trusted environment, can
malware/ransomware update files on the protected partition?
No, without the high-entropy key sealed in TPM, software on
the host system cannot break the write protection enforced
by SED. 2) Inside the trusted environment (updater), can the
malware/ransomware trick the user or the updater to write
arbitrary content? The updater does not synchronize any file
deletion from the original partition but only adds files from it.
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With the updater’s integrity ensured by TXT/SVM, user I/O
cannot be influenced by any external software.
(a) Forged user interface. Due to human users’ inability to
authenticate machines (cf. Stark [48]), rootkit malware may
mimic the appearance of the intended application, where the
user may leak secrets. However, the adversary will not benefit
from it, as there is no UI in Inuksuk for prompting for the
SED unlock secret (in fact, the unlock secret is unknown to
users). Also, for manual deletion, there is no way to specify
which files to delete from outside the trusted updater (files are
selected in TXT/SVM right before they are deleted). In the
end, without the genuine updater in TXT/SVM, the adversary
cannot manipulate any file on the protected partition.
In addition to leaking secrets, forged UI can also help
malware hide termination (skipping execution of Inuksuk),
making the user believe the update has occurred (actually it
was a fake one). To discern, the user can configure a per-
deployment secret such as an avatar or short phrase to be
shown in the trusted updater (mini file browser). Because of the
exclusiveness and I/O isolation of TXT/SVM, rootkit malware
will not learn this secret and thus is unable to forge a genuine-
looking UI with the correct secret.
(b) Malicious termination, modification or removal of
Inuksuk. A simple but effective attack against Inuksuk is
terminating its kernel driver in the OS, or even completely
removing it. Similar to rootkit malware’s termination of host-
based anti-malware defenses, rootkit ransomware can easily
launch this attack against Inuksuk.7 The pre-existing files on
the protected partition remain immune to this attack; however,
newly created or updated files thereafter are not protected. As
with the forged UI attack mitigation, the user-defined avatar
or short phrase can indicate the correct execution of Inuksuk
in TXT/SVM, regardless of other tampering outside. Minimal
user diligence is needed to just make sure the Inuksuk UI
is regularly (automatically or manually) seen with this avatar
or phrase. Note that modifying the Inuksuk updater’s binary,
which may reside on the unprotected partition, does not help
the attacker; the SED unlock secret can only be accessed by
the genuine Inuksuk updater (TPM unsealing).
(c) Known attacks against SEDs. Müller et al. [47] show that
SEDs are also vulnerable to known attacks against software
FDEs (e.g., cold boot, warm boot, DMA, and evil-maid). They
also found a simple attack called hot plug, enabled by the fact
that SEDs are always in a binary state of locked or unlocked.
Once it becomes unlocked in a legitimate manner (e.g., user-
supplied unlock passwords), the adversary can connect the
disk to another attacker-controlled machine without cutting
power, and can get access to protected data. In addition to
these attacks, an adversary may also capture the cleartext SED
secret/password from the SATA interface, e.g., by tapping the
connection pins with a logic analyzers. Since all such attacks
require physical access, i.e., desoldering a microchip, manip-
ulating the connector or evil maid attacks, they are not viable
for a scalable ransomware attack. More recently, different from
the design limitations above, certain implementation flaws have
been identified by Meijer and van Gastel [43], which severely
affects SED security. To our understanding, the current SED-
specific flaws, e.g., user password and DEK not linked,
7Malicious termination can be made difficult by registering Inuksuk as a
Windows Early Launch Antimalware (ELAM) driver.
mostly concern data confidentiality (with physical access),
whereas Inuksuk’s goal is data integrity (i.e., write protection).
However, there exist undocumented vendor-specific commands
(VSCs)8 on certain storage devices that allow flashing unsigned
firmware (directly or indirectly), which completely breaks
TEEDisk. Among SED disks, Crucial (Micron) MX100 and
MX200 are vulnerable with such VSCs as reported by Meijer
and van Gastel. We may have to choose those SED drives
without such VSCs (e.g., after static analysis of firmware
extracted via JTAG). Caution is always necessary when taking
devices with firmware as part of the TCB (cf. the threat model
of FlashGuard [24]). Last but not least, usually major SED
manufacturers apply certain form of authentication/verification
of the firmware before being updated to the drive, e.g., Secure
Downloads and Diagnostics.9
(d) Attacks on TXT/TPM. Although TPMs offer some phys-
ical tamper-resistance, TPMs and similar security chips have
been successfully attacked in the past (e.g., [28], [63], [58],
[34], [73]); see also Nemec et al. [49]. However, with physical
access excluded, we do not need to consider these attacks;
also note that tapping TPM pins and DMA attacks require a
malicious device to be connected. Regarding known software-
only attacks against TXT, most such attacks are ad-hoc (e.g.,
the SINIT module flaw [76]), or version-specific; Intel has
purportedly patched them in the subsequent versions, or at least
the user is motivated to choose one that has no known flaws.
There are also attacks against TXT (e.g., [75]) that exploit
the System Management Mode (SMM), an intrinsic part of the
Intel x86 architecture, referred to as Ring -2. If the SMI (SMM
interrupt) handler is compromised and SMI is left enabled,
it can preempt the TXT execution and intercept trusted
operations. Although no OS, hypervisor or bootloader runs in
parallel with Inuksuk to trigger SMI (e.g., by writing to port
0xB2), certain micro-architectural behavior may facilitate such
attacks, e.g., the CPU temperature sensor. Nevertheless, certain
Intel CPUs leave SMI disabled after SINIT in TXT [26];
we can also explicitly disable SMI generation with the
Southbridge (model-specific) upon entry to our code, as SMI
is not needed in Inuksuk. This at least significantly reduces
the attack time window to just the number of CPU cycles
needed to disable it. Especially, for AMD CPUs [9], external
SMI interrupts that assert after the start of SKINIT execution
will be held pending (to ensure atomicity of SKINIT) until
software subsequently sets GIF to 1 (internal SMIs are lost).
We do not set GIF back to 1, and rely on polling instead
(we do not gain extra performance with interrupts in our
single-threaded environment). Another possible (powerful)
attack avenue similar to SMM is vulnerable Intel Management
Engine firmware [16]. Unless there is a pressing need for
ME, we suggest to disable it in a rigorous manner (for efforts
and difficulties, see [54], as there is no architecture support
for disabling ME and SMI elegantly).
(e) Compromise-then-DMA attacks. Although very unlikely
to occur, we still consider a special situation where a DMA
attack can be mounted but argue that it does not pose any
threat. The remote adversary or malware can compromise
a programmable peripheral (e.g., a functionality-rich gaming
8These VSCs are like regular commands sent through the SATA or NVMe
interface, which can be done by any privileged code.
9Seagate (our SED) prevents counterfeit firmware: https://www.seagate.
com/ca/en/solutions/security/
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keyboard) and use it as the attack device. Then Inuksuk’s
exposed DMA buffer (not covered by Intel VT-d or AMD
DEV protections) might be manipulated by that compromised
peripheral (malware/ransomware). Those buffers only contain
content to be written, while LBA location/sector count is still
sent via regular I/O (WRITE-DMA-EXT), i.e., the adversary
cannot point to the location of existing protected files. There-
fore, encrypting the DMA buffers buys the adversary no more
than doing the same outside Inuksuk, i.e., contaminating files
on the unprotected partition. We can also reconfigure (every
time inside TXT/SVM) DMA remapping in a way that the con-
cerned range is only accessible to a specific PCI device (SED).
(f) Delayed attacks after deletion. Persistent ransomware
can stay hidden for a long period (ranging from weeks to
months), during which it just transparently decrypts encrypted
data when accessed [22]. This can trick the user to believe
that her data is intact (when viewed from within the OS). At
some point, if she removes older versions to save space or
auto-deletion is triggered, then the ransom can be demanded
(i.e., no more showing the decrypted version).
The root cause of this problem is that OS-based file viewers
(e.g., Microsoft Word), run outside the trusted environment and
can be manipulated by rootkit ransomware arbitrarily, such
as performing decryption before displaying a file to the user,
or simply feeding a cached, unencrypted copy of the file.
A straightforward countermeasure is to perform verification
inside the updater before removing previous versions, e.g.,
by porting advanced file viewing tools in TXT/SVM, which
can require significant effort. Such delayed attacks can be
classified into two cases: 1) Ransomware-triggered file updates
to exhaust version limits/space. 2) Updates piggybacking on le-
gitimate user edits. Regular user files are either less frequently
edited, or configured with a proper schedule to consolidate
frequent edits. Therefore, the latter would take a long time
for enough number of versions or age. We thus argue that the
former would be more effective for the adversary. Nevertheless,
Inuksuk can show an update log (with the list of files com-
mitted) to the user in the trusted updater on each run. It will
raise an alert if the user notices files being committed that she
has not touched. According to our file selection principles (see
Section IV-B), the number of files being committed each time
should account for a very small portion of all the protected files
(e.g., 5 files out of 1000) unless the total number is also small.
In general, if auto-deletion with aging is enabled, we sug-
gest the duration should be long, e.g., a year or two, depending
on the size of the protected partition. Note that, delayed attacks
risk being discovered and mitigated by anti-malware vendors,
and thus we do not consider them a serious threat.
(g) Attacking auto-deletion with aging. If older file versions
are automatically deleted after a preset threshold (e.g., 365
days), a straightforward threat is clock source manipulation.
Rootkit ransomware can adjust the system time (to a far future
date) to fool Inuksuk to believe the versions are already too
old to be kept. To address this, Inuksuk can be configured to
only trust a signed NTP time from a remote server, absence
of which will stop auto-deletion (see Section IV-B).
VII. RELATED WORK
There are many solutions dealing with user-level mal-
ware/ransomware for data protection; only FlashGuard [24]
targets rootkit-level ransomware. However, some solutions
against data manipulation by rootkit malware (not specific to
rootkit-level ransomware) are close to Inuksuk in spirit. We
discuss several examples from each category.
Reverse-engineered keys. Early-day ransomware had the
(symmetric) file encryption keys embedded in their obfuscated
binaries, or stored in a C&C server. Keys could be recovered
by reverse-engineering their code or intercepting C&C traffic.
Ransomware now generally uses a public key to encrypt a
random file encryption key, and the private key remains only at
the attacker’s machine (cf. [78]), and thus much more resilient
than before; however, implementation flaws [74] may still be
leveraged to recover encryption keys. An exemplary umbrella
solution is NoMoreRansom [5], clustering file recovery efforts
from several public and industry partners. However, relying on
ransomware authors’ mistakes is a non-solution, and finding
such exploits may be too late for early victims.
Offline and online backups. An obvious recovery-based
countermeasure against malware/ransomware is to make of-
fline backup of important data regularly (on media discon-
nected from the computer or with device-enforced write
protection, as ransomware also attempts to erase accessible
backups). Although simple in theory, effective deploymen-
t/use of backup tools could be non-trivial, e.g., determining
frequency of backups, checking integrity of backups regu-
larly (see Laszka et al. [35] for an economic analysis of
paying ransom vs. backup strategies). More problematically,
the disconnected/write-protected media must be connected/un-
locked (online) during backup, at which point, malware/ran-
somware can encrypt/delete the files (see [24], [41]). For
cloud-based backup systems, such as Dropbox (centralized)
and Syncthing.net (P2P), a potential issue is the size of their
TCB (includes a full OS with multiple network-facing servers),
which may lead to large-scale data loss, if compromised.
Rootkit-level solutions. S4 [60] is proposed as a self-securing
storage entity behind a security perimeter, which records all
file operations (like journaling or auditing) and retains old
versions of user files. It is implemented as a network service
(similar to NFS), and assumed to be resistant to compromise
by a remote party (due to S4’s limited outward interface). The
usage scenario is focused on intrusion survival and forensics
collection, in the case of an admin account compromise in a
client machine. As S4 promptly stores all changes made to the
client machine, as soon as possible, its storage overhead can be
significant. To address this challenge, S4 makes use of novel
compression and differential versioning techniques, which can
benefit Inuksuk as well. Also, without any TEE to ensure
execution integrity and secrecy, it involves the whole server
infrastructure as the TCB, exposing many attack vectors. More
likely than a full system compromise, if the admin account of
S4 (or any similar backup system) is hacked, large volumes of
data may be lost at once.
FlashGuard [24] proposes to modify the garbage collection
mechanism of SSD firmware (assuming vendor support), so
that for suspicious overwrites (i.e., first read and then written in
a quick succession), a copy of the original data block is kept for
a preset amount of time (e.g., 20 days). FlashGuard leverages a
unique out-of-place write feature of modern SSDs (in contrast
to regular hard drives), which provides an implicit backup
of recently overwritten data blocks. The user is expected to
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detect any attack before the preset time elapses and perform
the recovery from a separate machine; otherwise the data will
be lost. The detection of suspicious overwrites can be an issue;
e.g., ransomware can read and encrypt the file, and at some
later point (i.e., not immediately to avoid being flagged), delete
the file. However, this can be solved by retaining all deleted
data blocks, at the expense of increased storage overhead.
FlashGuard authors also do not specify the clock source to
measure the preset time; SSDs do not offer any trusted clock,
and relying on OS/BIOS could be fatal.
Rootkit-resistant disks (RRD [12]) are designed to resist
rootkit infection of system binaries, which are labelled at
installation time, and write operations to protected binaries are
mediated by the disk controller. System binaries are updated
by booting into a safe state in the presence of a security token.
While effective against rootkit infection, RRD is infeasible
against ransomware that targets regular user files (adding/up-
dating will require reboot). Inuksuk’s goals are complementary
to RRD’s and exclude protecting system binaries.
User-level solutions. Defenses are usually implemented as sys-
tem services, kernel drivers (unprivileged adversary), or even
user-land applications. For instance, Redemption [30] explic-
itly mentions that their TCB includes the display module, OS
kernel, and underlying software. Redemption claims to provide
real-time ransomware protection, by inspecting system-wide
I/O request patterns. Its detection approach involves a com-
prehensive list of features, with both content-based (entropy,
overwriting and deletion) and behavior-based (e.g., directory
traversal). In the end, a malice score is calculated to facilitate
decisions. Redemption creates a protected area, called reflected
file, which caches the write requests during inspection; the file
is periodically flushed to disk (if no anomaly is identified).
This ensures data consistency in case of false positives, i.e., if
the suspicious operations is confirmed by the user to be benign,
there is still the chance to restore the discarded data.
In an effort to achieve better universality and robust-
ness, some proposals are purely data-centric (i.e., agnostic to
program execution, checking just the outcome). E.g., Cryp-
toDrop [55] focuses on file transformation information for
individual files, regardless of where those transformations
come from. It also claims to achieve early detection. It employs
three novel indicators to detect suspicious file operations. Low
file similarity before and after may indicate encryption but
legitimate operations can also cause it (e.g., a blurred JPG
file). Shannon entropy can be used in detecting encryption
although compression also leads to high entropy. Last, file type
changes (through content parsing) might not be robust enough
with format-preserving encryption [59].
Although most ransomware mitigation techniques aim to
detect/prevent ransomware as the primary goal, very few also
focus on recovery, e.g., PayBreak [32]. Symmetric keys used
by ransomware to encrypt user data are captured through
crypto function hooking before they are encrypted with the
adversary’s public key, and then stored in a secure key vault.
When infection is detected or a ransom is demanded, the user
can retrieve the keys for decryption without paying the ransom.
PayBreak’s crypto function hooking works for both statically
and dynamically linked binaries, but only if the ransomware
uses known third-party crypto libraries. Also, it is subject to
evasion by obfuscation for statically linked ransomware. The
key vault, even though encrypted with the user’s public key
and protected by the admin privilege, can still be easily erased
by rootkit ransomware.
ShieldFS [14] is a copy-on-write shadowing filesystem
reactive to ransomware detection, which is also based on
I/O requests (I/O Request Packets - IRPs). Its methodology
fits in the intersection of recovery-based solutions and data
loss prevention, and thus is similar to Inuksuk in positioning.
The detection portion also makes use of numerous behavioral
features reflected from the IRPs. Specifically, ShieldFS’s
cryptographic primitives detection, different from PayBreak’s,
does not rely on hooking known crypto libraries, but captures
inevitable properties of crypto primitives, such as the key
schedule pre-computation of block ciphers. To achieve the
claimed self-healing, on the first write attempt, ShieldFS
keeps a copy of the original file in a protected location (only
from userland processes); once an anomaly is detected, the
changes made can be reverted with this copy, or otherwise it
can be deleted at any time.
Microsoft BitLocker [77] is a widely-used (enterprise) data
protection tool integrated with the Windows OS. BitLocker
provides strong confidentiality guarantees through TPM-bound
encryption. However, when a BitLocker-protected partition is
unlocked after a successful boot (i.e., accessible to the OS and
applications), there is no way to distinguish a malicious write
attempt from legitimate ones, and thus making the protected
data vulnerable to even user-level ransomware attacks.
For advanced data protection in iOS, Apple’s secure en-
clave co-processor (SEP [40]) is also a form of hardware
security feature, enabling memory encryption and credentials
management (among other functions). The SEP communicates
with the application processors (APs) via a mechanism called
Secure Mailbox. From the limited public documentation, it
appears that per-application access control is possible with
SEP, therefore, decryption (and thus updates) can be only
exposed to the right application.
Closest to Inuksuk in design components is Pesos by Krahn
et al. [33] but with different goals and threat model; they use
Intel SGX as TEEHost and Kinetic Open Storage as TEEDisk.
The high-level similarity is that TEEHost, enforcing certain
storage protection rules, connects to and is authenticated by
TEEDisk, and the Disk is capable of executing operations
assigned by TEEHost. The major contribution is the flattened ab-
straction layers and a rich set of storage policies exposed. Pe-
sos assumes that only remote servers (the Host) are potentially
malicious and the client machine is trusted, hence excluding
(rootkit) ransomware/malware on the client machine. There-
fore, trusted UI is no longer a problem, so the user can perform
administrative operations (if needed) from the client, such as
specifying which files to delete through encrypted network to
TEEHost. Since the kinetic storage supports secure communi-
cation (TLS), WAN network as an insecure Interface can be
used. In addition, if placed in Inuksuk’s setting, it suffers from
the same issue of untrusted data source, i.e., there is no way to
distinguish malicious writes from benign ones, unless all ap-
plications can be ported and contained in SGX or TXT/SVM.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In summary, we propose to focus on data loss prevention, in
an effort to address rootkit-level data alteration as exemplified
by ransomware, a significant threat that remains largely unad-
dressed in current state-of-the-art solutions. We leverage the
trusted execution environments (TEEs) available with modern
computing devices and reason along various TEE placements
between the host and the storage device. Intel TXT and AMD
SVM in conjunction with TCG Opal SED are chosen for
Inuksuk as our current prototype. Inuksuk leaves original user
files in use with applications and exposes the protected copies
as read-only all the time, and silently accepts creation/modifi-
cation of the files by preserving previous versions. Users are
only involved in file deletion occasionally in the trusted envi-
ronment (e.g., for regular file deletion or in case the protected
partition becomes full). Although our current prototypes are
less than ideal (e.g., file transfer performance), we believe
Inuksuk is a solid step towards countering rootkit ransomware.
The source code of our prototypes will be made available
through: https://madiba.encs.concordia.ca/software.html.
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